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מכון להוראה וטהרת המשפחה מלבורן

בס"ד מכון להוראה וטהרת המשפחה מלבורן בס"ד מכון להוראה וטהרת המשפחה מלבורן בס"ד מכון להוראה וטהרת המשפחה מלבורן בס"ד מכון להוראה וטהרת המשפחה מלבורן
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בס"ד

מכון להוראה וטהרת המשפחה מלבורן

בס"ד מכון להוראה וטהרת המשפחה מלבורן בס"ד מכון להוראה וטהרת המשפחה מלבורן בס"ד מכון להוראה וטהרת המשפחה מלבורן
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Halachik Responsa By Rabbi Mendel Zirkind of Melbourne (2)

Drying Hands After Netilas Yadayim for Bread Using a Hand-Drying Machine:

Tevilas Keilim When Purchasing Utensils for Gifting or Mishloach Manos Question: If one purchases a dish, jar, or similar utensil with the intention of filling it with food or drink and gifting it to a friend, or using it for Mishloach Manos, does the utensil require tevilah before it is used?

Tevilas Keilim When Purchasing Utensils for Gifting or Mishloach Manos Question: If one purchases a dish, jar, or similar utensil with the intention of filling it with food or drink and gifting it to a friend, or using it for Mishloach Manos, does the utensil require tevilah before it is used?

 Halachic Overview
The Gemara[1] teaches that one who eats bread without drying his hands is considered as eating “impure bread.” The Rishonim debate what this impurity means. Rashi[2] explains that the issue is simple miyus: eating bread with wet hands is unclean and repulsive. The Mordechai[3], however, understands the impurity literal

 Halachic Overview
The Gemara[1] teaches that one who eats bread without drying his hands is considered as eating “impure bread.” The Rishonim debate what this impurity means. Rashi[2] explains that the issue is simple miyus: eating bread with wet hands is unclean and repulsive. The Mordechai[3], however, understands the impurity literally. Since hands are considered shniyos l’tumah[4] due to the likelihood of contacting unknown substances, water from the first pouring (when less than a reviis is used) becomes impure, and the second pouring removes that impurity. According to this view, vigorous drying is necessary to ensure no impure water remains. The core dispute is whether drying is required for basic cleanliness or for the removal of impurity[5].
Two practical ramifications emerge. First, regarding the type of drying: if the purpose is merely cleanliness, it should not matter how the hands dry, and even waiting until they air-dry would suffice[6]. But if drying is meant to remove impurity, then only active, physical drying—specifically rubbing—can accomplish this. Second, regarding the amount of water used: the issue of impure water arises only when less than a reviis is used during the first pouring. If one uses a reviis, the water does not become impure[7]. According to the cleanliness-based view, this distinction doesn’t matter. Since most people today wash with more than a reviis, one might conclude that simply waiting for the hands to dry should be acceptable[8]—but the Alter Rebbe clarifies otherwise.
In Shulchan Aruch[9], the Alter Rebbe brings both reasons and notes that, according to the impurity-based explanation, one must not allow the hands to dry on their own. Rather, one must dry them with a towel or similar material, because the act of rubbing (shifshuf) provides an additional element of purification. In the Siddur[10], he rules that one should pour twice on each hand even when using a full reviis, in order to satisfy all opinions. This suggests that, according to the stricter view, even a reviis can leave behind water considered impure. The practical outcome is that in all cases—whether or not a reviis was used—hands must be actively dried, and merely letting them air-dry is insufficient[11].
Based on the Alter Rebbe’s presentation, two halachic concerns arise with using a hot-air machine. First, the leftover water is not actively removed and may retain its impurity according to the stricter opinion. Second, the drying process lacks shifshuf—the rubbing action that adds purification[12]. As a result, using a hot-air blower is effectively the same as letting the hands air-dry, and therefore does not satisfy the ideal method of drying before eating bread[13].
In situations where no towels are available—such as in wedding halls, public venues, or airports—many poskim allow using a hot-air dryer[14]. Since the requirement for rubbing is considered a taharah yeseirah (an additional purification), one may rely on leniencies when no alternative exists and still eat bread.
Halacha: L’chatchila, one should only use a towel or the like when drying hands before eating bread, and not use a hand drying machine. If, however, that is the only thing available, it could be used.  



[1] סוטה ד:
[2] שם ד"ה כל האוכל
[3] ברכות הובא בב"י סי' קנ"ח
[4] ראה לשון שוע"ר סי' קנ"ח:א
[5] עי' משנ"ב סי' קנ"ח סקמ"ו
[6] עי' שו"ת אז נדברו ח"ח סי' נ"ב וקוצה"ש סי' ל"ב בבדי השולחן סקי"ג
[7] שוע"ר קנ"ח:י"ז
[8] עי' שו"ת אז נדברו שם
[9] שם
[10] סדר נטיל"י סעי' ב
[11] עי' קצוה"ש שם
[12] כנלפע"ד
[13] כנלפע"ד ועי' שו"ת שרגא המאיר ח"ד סי' ד
[14] עי' שו"ת אז נדברו שם ושו"ת קנין תורה ח"ג סי' י"ט


Tevilas Keilim When Purchasing Utensils for Gifting or Mishloach Manos Question: If one purchases a dish, jar, or similar utensil with the intention of filling it with food or drink and gifting it to a friend, or using it for Mishloach Manos, does the utensil require tevilah before it is used?

Tevilas Keilim When Purchasing Utensils for Gifting or Mishloach Manos Question: If one purchases a dish, jar, or similar utensil with the intention of filling it with food or drink and gifting it to a friend, or using it for Mishloach Manos, does the utensil require tevilah before it is used?

Tevilas Keilim When Purchasing Utensils for Gifting or Mishloach Manos Question: If one purchases a dish, jar, or similar utensil with the intention of filling it with food or drink and gifting it to a friend, or using it for Mishloach Manos, does the utensil require tevilah before it is used?



Answer: The Gemara teaches that the obligation of tevilas keilim applies specifically to utensils acquired from a non-Jew. If a utensil is merely borrowed from a non-Jew, immersion is not required.

The reason is that the Torah’s command is patterned after the spoils of Midyan, where the Jewish people acquired full ownership of the utensils



Answer: The Gemara teaches that the obligation of tevilas keilim applies specifically to utensils acquired from a non-Jew. If a utensil is merely borrowed from a non-Jew, immersion is not required.

The reason is that the Torah’s command is patterned after the spoils of Midyan, where the Jewish people acquired full ownership of the utensils. Thus, the chiyuv of tevilah arises only when a Jew gains ownership of a utensil from a non-Jew.

Tosafos explains that if a Jew purchases a utensil from a non-Jew and then lends it to another Jew, the borrower must immerse the utensil before using it.

The rationale is that the obligation of tevilah already took effect at the moment of the first Jew’s acquisition from the non-Jew. Once the chiyuv attaches to the cheftza of the utensil, it follows the utensil into the hands of subsequent Jewish users.

The Hagohos Ashirei qualifies this principle. He maintains that the above is true only if the original purchaser intended to use the utensil for food-related purposes. If, however, the purchaser intended to use the utensil for non-food-related purposes, no obligation of tevilah arises, and consequently, the borrower is not required to immerse it either.

The underlying logic is that the obligation of tevilas keilim depends on two conditions: The utensil was acquired from a non-Jew. And the utensil is designated as a keli seudah, i.e., intended for food-related use. 

In this case, although the first condition is met, the second is not. Therefore, no obligation of tevilah arises at the point of acquisition. Moreover, when the borrower uses the utensil, it is no longer in the possession of a non-Jew. Thus, neither party is obligated to immerse it.

This reveals a fundamental principle: The chiyuv of tevilas keilim is not generated by ownership alone, but by ownership coupled with designation for food use.

The Beis Yosef derives from the above discussion that the same conceptual framework applies to a Jewish retailer. If a Jewish store owner purchases utensils from a non-Jewish manufacturer for the purpose of resale, and not for personal use, then the retailer himself is not obligated to immerse the utensils, since his acquisition lacks the element of designation for food use.

Moreover, one might argue that a Jewish customer who subsequently purchases the utensil from the store should likewise be exempt from tevilah, since the utensil never simultaneously satisfied both criteria required for the obligation: (1) acquisition from a non-Jew, and (2) designation as a keli seudah by a Jew.

However, the Beis Yosef ultimately expresses doubt regarding this conclusion and writes that this exemption applies only where the Jewish customer merely borrows or rents the utensil from the retailer. In such a case, the customer is not obligated to immerse it, since the utensil was never acquired by him from a non-Jew. By contrast, if the customer purchases the utensil for personal use as a keli seudah, he is obligated to immerse it. This position is also adopted by Rama.

Thus, according to the Beis Yosef and the Rama, the decisive factor is not the retailer’s intent, but the customer’s act of acquisition for food use.

The Taz cites the Isser VeHeter, who proposes a different approach. He suggests that the case of a Jewish retailer is fundamentally different from that of a purchaser for non-food purposes. Although the retailer intends to resell the utensil, the fact remains that he acquired it from a non-Jew, and in principle, he could have chosen to retain it for personal use. This latent potential for personal use may itself be sufficient to generate the obligation of tevilah.

If so, then even when a Jewish customer borrows or rents the utensil from the store, he would be obligated to immerse it, since the utensil already carries the latent obligation that emerged from the retailer’s acquisition.

The Taz and Shach rule that in such a case, the utensil should indeed be immersed, but without a beracha.

Other poskim disagree with the Taz and Shach and follow the logic of the Beis Yosef and the Rama, who do not cite the Isser VeHeter. According to this view, no obligation of tevilah exists when the utensil is borrowed or rented from a Jewish retailer. The practical consensus is to adopt a stringent approach in accordance with the Taz and Shach, but in cases of difficulty, one may rely on the more lenient position of the Beis Yosef and the Rama.

A practical nafka mina arises in the case of a store or service that purchases utensils from non-Jews for the purpose of renting them out for simchas. According to the stringent view (Taz and Shach), the renter should immerse the utensils before use, but without a beracha. According to the lenient view (Beis Yosef and Rama), immersion is not required. In practice, one should ideally be stringent where feasible, but in situations of significant difficulty, one may rely on the lenient opinion. Furthermore, if the renter immersed the utensils, he should notify the owner so that subsequent customers are aware that tevilah has already been performed. 

What emerges from the above discussion is that, according to all opinions, when the original Jewish purchaser acquires utensils with the intention of resale, no obligation of tevilah arises at that stage.

Moreover, it is reasonable to argue that if the reseller nevertheless immerses the utensils, such immersion is halachically ineffective, since the obligation has not yet taken effect. The chiyuv of tevilas keilim begins only once the utensils enter the possession of a Jew who intends to use them for food-related purposes in a personal context.

Accordingly, in a case where one purchases a utensil with the intention of filling it with food and gifting it to another Jew, it would appear, based on the logic of the Hagohos Ashirei, that no obligation of tevilah should arise at the point of purchase, since the buyer does not intend to retain or personally use the utensil.

However, some poskim question whether these two cases are truly comparable. They suggest that gifting a utensil is not equivalent to purchasing it for non-food-related purposes. In the case of a gift, although the buyer does not intend to keep the utensil permanently, he nevertheless acquires it as a keli seudah and retains the ability to use it for himself.

According to this approach, following the logic of the Isser VeHeter, the buyer may indeed be obligated to immerse the utensil before filling it with food or drink and gifting it. If so, he should perform the tevilah first and clearly indicate to the recipient that the utensil has already been immersed in a mikvah.

Furthermore, some suggest an additional conceptual approach. Even if we accept that no obligation of tevilah arises at the time the original purchaser acquires the utensil, since he does not intend to use it for personal food purposes, it is nevertheless possible that he possesses the ability to remove the future obligation from the recipient to whom he intends to gift the utensil.

The reasoning is as follows: although the chiyuv of tevilas keilim has not yet taken effect, it is destined to arise once the utensil enters the possession of a Jew who intends to use it as a keli seudah. Since the original purchaser currently holds full ownership of the utensil, he may be able to perform tevilah at this stage in a manner that preemptively fulfills the future obligation on behalf of the eventual user.

According to this approach, even though the obligation has not technically begun, the original buyer’s immersion of the utensil would not be meaningless. Rather, it would function as a valid tevilah that removes the forthcoming obligation from the recipient.

According to other authorities, the above reasoning cannot be accepted. Since no obligation of tevilah exists at the time the utensil is in the possession of the purchaser, who does not intend to use it personally, the tevilah performed at that stage cannot remove the future obligation. In other words, where no chiyuv has yet taken effect, there is nothing for the tevilah to discharge.

Consequently, once the recipient of the gift receives the utensil and intends to use it as a keli seudah, the obligation of tevilah arises anew, and the utensil must be immersed again.

According to this view, it would follow that one should preferably refrain from immersing such utensils prior to gifting them, particularly in the case of glass utensils. Instead, one should inform the recipient that the utensils require tevilah before use.

L’halacha: When one purchases a utensil to fill it with food or drink and give it as a gift or for Mishloach Manos, one is not required to immerse the utensil beforehand. Rather, one should attach a note informing the recipient that the utensil requires tevilah before use.


1 עבודה זרה עה

2 שם ד"ה אבל

3 תוספת שם, ועיין בשו"ת הרדב"ז סימן תשמה

4 על הרא"ש ע"ז סימן לה

5 יורה דעה סימן קכ סעיף ח6 סימן קכ סעיף ח בהגהה

7 שם ס"ק י

8 שם

9 ס"ק טז

10 פר"ח ס"ק כב, פרי תואר ס"ק יא, עיין פתחי תשובה קכ ס"ק ט

11 עיין פתחי תשובה שם320

 12 עיין ספר פסקים ותשובות סימן קכ אות לד ובהערה

13 עיין שו"ת אבני נזר יו"ד סימן קז, שו"ת משנה הלכות חלק יב סימן לא, שו"ת מנחת אשר חלק ג סימן נה אות ד

,14 עיין שו"ת מנחת יצחק חלק ז סימן מג, שו"ת יביע אומר חלק ז סימן ט אות ב, ספר טבילת כלים פ"ח הערה ז

.שו"ת מנחת שלמה חלק ב סימן סו אות כ

15 עיין בשו"תים הנ"ל

Is One Allowed to Buy a Black Coffee at a Non-Jewish Convenience Store?

Tevilas Keilim When Purchasing Utensils for Gifting or Mishloach Manos Question: If one purchases a dish, jar, or similar utensil with the intention of filling it with food or drink and gifting it to a friend, or using it for Mishloach Manos, does the utensil require tevilah before it is used?

Is One Allowed to Buy a Black Coffee at a Non-Jewish Convenience Store?


The Issue of Bishul Akum
The Mishnah  teaches that certain foods prepared by a non-Jew are forbidden, including bread and cooked foods, even when no non-kosher ingredients are suspected, due to the concern of intermarriage
The Gemara  explains that the prohibition of bishul akum applies only to foods that meet two criteria: The food c


The Issue of Bishul Akum
The Mishnah  teaches that certain foods prepared by a non-Jew are forbidden, including bread and cooked foods, even when no non-kosher ingredients are suspected, due to the concern of intermarriage
The Gemara  explains that the prohibition of bishul akum applies only to foods that meet two criteria: The food cannot be eaten raw. The food is considered fit for a royal table (oleh al shulchan melachim). Halacha follows this ruling . Contemporary Poskim  explain that “fit for royalty” refers to foods that would be served at an official or dignified meal.
Applying these criteria to coffee: Coffee beans, water, and similar ingredients are not considered foods fit for royalty. Moreover, water itself is clearly exempt from bishul akum , and coffee is fundamentally water-based. Therefore, from the perspective of bishul akum alone, black coffee would generally not be prohibited .
The Question of Inedible Ingredients Becoming Edible
There is a dispute among the Poskim  regarding substances that are initially inedible but become edible through cooking it with other ingredients. Do we evaluate their status based on their original inedibility or their final edible form?
This dispute impacts coffee . Coffee beans are inedible even after roasting, and only become consumable when combined with water (and sometimes sugar or milk). A further argument is that, based on the principle of following the majority component , coffee should be viewed primarily as water, which is certainly permitted.
Thus, from the standpoint of bishul akum, there is substantial room for leniency.
The Issue of Utensils and Absorbed Non-Kosher Taste
Even if bishul akum is not a problem, there remains a separate concern: the kashrut status of the utensils and machines used to prepare the coffee.
Halacha  teaches that when utensils are washed together with hot water, absorbed taste from non-kosher food can transfer and render other utensils non-kosher. Since most convenience stores and coffee shops serve non-kosher food or non-Cholov Yisroel milk, there is a real concern that the coffee machine and related equipment may have absorbed non-kosher taste, rendering the coffee itself prohibited .
One might attempt to rely on the rule that utensils of unknown usage status are assumed to be unused for 24 hours (eino ben yomo) , in which case the absorbed taste is weakened. However, this leniency does not apply here, since it is obvious that such machines are used continuously throughout the day. Nor can one necessarily rely on detergents to neutralize absorbed taste (noten ta’am lifgam), since not all cleaning agents achieve this halachic effect .
Nevertheless, there is room for leniency in certain cases . Large chains such as Starbucks and well-regulated stores often maintain strict hygiene and separation procedures for equipment. If one has reliable knowledge, whether through observation or inquiry , that the coffee equipment is not used in a way that creates kashrut concerns, the coffee may be permitted.
L’halacha: There is room to permit purchasing black coffee from a non-Jewish convenience store, provided one has reasonable assurance that there is no issue with the utensils. Nevertheless, it is fitting for a God-fearing Jew to refrain from purchasing coffee and entering establishments that sell non-kosher food out of concern for mar’it ayin  and the ideal of vehiyitem nekiyim .





1.  ע"ז ל"ב: ועיין פרש"י שם
2.  שם ל"ח. ב' לישני בגמרא ור"ת פסק כשניהם (עיין  תוספות ד"ה איכא)
3.  שו"ע יו"ד סימן קיג:א
4.  הגהות חזו"א ועיין בדרכי תשובה שם
5.  ולהעיר משוע"ר סימן רנד:יד
6.  עיין בדרכי תשובה ריש סימן קיג, וביד אפרים שם.
7.  עיין פרמ"ג משב"ז סימן קיב ס"ק ג, ודרכ"ת סימן קיג ס"ק ס"ד.
8.  עיין שד"ח אסיפת דינים אות ב במערכת בישולי עכו"ם, ודרכי תשובה סימן קיג סוס"ק ב וס"ד.
9.  שו"ע יו"ד סימן קיג:ב ובפרי חדש שם.
10.  שו"ע יו"ד סימן צה:ג, ועי' שש"כ פרק א סעיף מ"א, ובהערה קכ"ב שם, ושו"ת מנח"י ח"ב סי' ק, ושו"ת באר משה ח"ז קונ' אלקטריק סי' ס, (ולהעיר משיטת הגרמ"פ באגר"מ בכו"מ: או"ח ח"א סי' קד, וח"ג סי' נ"ח ד"ה וכן, ויו"ד ח"ב סי' כ"ח-ט, וח"ג סי'י).
11.  ש"ך סי' צ"ה ס"ק כ, וט"ז סי' צ"ד ס"ק א, ובשו"תים הנ"ל.
12.  סתם כלים אינם בני יומן שו"ע סימן קכב:ו וש"ך סימן קיב ס"ק ג.
13.  עיין בשו"ת מנח"י ובאר משה שם
14   מדין כלים מיוחדים עיין רמ"א סימן צ"ו:ו וט"ז שם, יד אפרים סי' קיב ס"ק ב, ושו"ת אהל משה מהדורא תניינא סימן קיז.
15.  דבזה נאמנין עיין שו"ע סי' ס"ט:י וש"ך וט"ז שם, ופתחי תשובה שם ס"ק י"ז, ועיין בשוע"ר סימן תנא:ה.
16.  עי' דרכ"ת סי' קיג ס"ק ב
17 .  עיין שו"ת חת"ס חלק ו סי' נט, ואגר"מ או"ח חלק ב סימן מ.

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Question: Is there an issue with food placed under a carriage where a baby sleeps?



Answer: The Gemara in Paschim[1] discusses various matters one should be careful about due to danger. One such thing is that food or drink should not be placed under a bed, for there is a Ruach Rah (an impure spirit).


The Gemara Yerushalmi[2] quotes a similar statement without giving a reason. The Rishonim dispute the underlying rationale: Rambam[3]rules that the concern is physical danger, possibly a harmful substance present under the bed that may enter the food unnoticed. The Ravaed[4] maintains that the reason follows the Bavli, namely, the presence of Ruach Ra’ah.

Further clarification is required regarding the concept of Ruach Ra’ah. We find numerous instances in which Chazal caution against certain behaviors due to Ruach Ra’ah, yet the precise nature of this phenomenon requires explanation.

The Toras Chaim [5] explains that when a person sleeps, he is considered “one-sixtieth of death” [6]. During sleep, a form of tumah — Ruach Ra’ah — attaches itself to the body and departs upon awakening. Accordingly, when food is placed beneath a bed upon which a person is sleeping, the sleeping individual functions halachically like an ohel, thereby transmitting this tumah — Ruach Ra’ah — to the food beneath him.

Based on this explanation, it emerges that the concern of Ruach Ra’ah is generated by the sleeping person, not by the physical location itself. The bed is not intrinsically problematic; rather, it serves as the framework through which the tumah produced during sleep can be conveyed.

Accordingly, the issue would apply specifically when food is placed beneath a bed upon which a person is actually sleeping. In the absence of a sleeping individual, there would be no basis for the transmission of Ruach Ra’ah, since the impurity stems from the state of sleep and not from the bed as an object.[7]

The halacha follows the opinion that the reason food or drink may not be placed under a bed is due to Ruach Ra’ah [8].

The Poskim dispute whether this ruling is limited specifically to a person sleeping on a bed, or whether it extends to any situation in which someone fell asleep, for example, on a chair. [9]

From the simple language of the Gemara in Pesachim [10], which states “under a bed,” it would appear that the case is limited to a bed. Moreover, falling asleep on a chair is generally brief and incidental, whereas sleeping on a bed typically constitutes established, regular sleep. Just as we find regarding Netilas Yadayim upon awakening that there is a distinction between a full sleep and a short doze [11], so too here it would stand to reason that the concern applies primarily to regular sleep. This may explain the Gemara’s precise wording, “under a bed,” rather than “under a place where one slept.”

It should be noted, however, that some Poskim [12] understand that the Gemara’s ruling is not dependent upon the person actively sleeping there, but rather that any bed, by definition, carries the concern of Ruach Ra’ah. Nevertheless, according to the explanation cited earlier, the more compelling logic is that the issue stems from the sleeping person and the state of sleep itself, not from the bed as a physical object.

There is an additional aspect discussed by the Poskim: whether the concern of Ruach Ra’ah applies specifically when the food is in direct contact with the ground, or even when there is a separation between the ground and the food, such as cushions or other objects. [13] [14]

We find in other halachic contexts that Ruach Ra’ah is associated with contact with the earth itself. For example, the halacha states that the water used for Mayim Acharonim should not be poured directly onto the ground, due to the presence of Ruach Ra’ah upon the earth. [15]

Accordingly, some authorities analyze whether the concern under a bed is heightened when the food is resting on the ground itself, as opposed to being elevated or separated from it. This factor may contribute further grounds for leniency in cases where the food is not in direct contact with the earth. 

As mentioned above, there is a conceptual connection between this din and Netilas Yadayim upon awakening. Both are rooted in the same underlying principle: that during sleep, a Tumah — identified as Ruach Ra’ah — rests upon a person and departs upon awakening. Just as one must remove that Ruach Ra’ah from the hands through washing, so too food placed beneath a sleeping person may be affected by that same impurity.

A related halachic question is whether this Ruach Ra’ah applies equally to daytime sleep. In other words, if one sleeps during the day, is the same impurity present such that one must wash their hands upon awakening? The Poskim discuss whether the phenomenon of Ruach Ra’ah is limited to nighttime sleep, which resembles a more complete state of withdrawal, or whether it applies to any substantive sleep, even during the day. [16]

The accepted ruling is that although the obligation is not as clear-cut as after nighttime sleep, it is nevertheless proper (lechatchilah) for one to wash his hands even after sleeping during the day without a berachah. [17]

There is an additional discussion in Halacha whether children below the age of chinuch must have their hands washed before touching food in the morning. [18]

The Alter Rebbe [19] explains that the impurity associated with sleep stems from the Nefesh Elokis. The Ruach Ra’ah seeks to attach itself specifically to holiness, to that which is spiritually elevated, to render it impure. Accordingly, a non-Jew, who does not possess a Nefesh Elokis in the same sense, does not contract this impurity through sleep or death.

Similarly, with regard to young children below the age of chinuch, since their Nefesh Elokis is not yet fully manifest (in its complete halachic expression until bar or bas mitzvah), there is no strict concern if they touch food before washing their hands upon awakening.

Nevertheless, since the holy soul begins to enter at earlier stages, for example, at the bris milah for a boy (and as discussed regarding a girl in the Rebbe’s sichos), there is certainly spiritual value and refinement in ensuring that even young children have their hands washed before touching food. While not obligatory in the strict halachic sense, it is a proper and praiseworthy practice.

From all of the above considerations, it would appear that there is no inherent issue with food or drink placed beneath a carriage in which a baby slept: A carriage is not classified as a bed. The food is generally not in direct contact with the ground. The baby’s sleep is typically during the day. Babies do not generate Ruach Ra’ah in the same manner as adults, particularly prior to the age of chinuch. [20]


Accordingly, there is a strong basis for leniency. Nevertheless, since we find that the removal of Ruach Ra’ah from the hands upon awakening is accomplished by pouring water three times alternately on each hand, it is proper (lechatchilah) that food which will not be damaged by washing, such as unpeeled fruits, be washed three times before use. However, food that would spoil if washed, or in a case where water is unavailable, may certainly be eaten without concern. [21]

L’halacha: Food or drink placed under a carriage in which a baby has slept is permitted. Unpeeled foods (e.g., apples) that can be washed without damage should be washed three times, as one would do when washing hands after sleep. Food or drink that would spoil if washed, or when water is unavailable, may be used without concern.


     

         

  

  

  



[1] קי"ב.

[2] שם

[3] הל' רוצח

[4] שם וכן דעת הר"ן בפסחים שם

[5] במס' שבועות מ"ט

[6] כמבואר בזהר וגמ שבת עי' שוע"ר מהדור"ת סי' ד:ב

[7] עי' שו"ת לב חיים ח"א סי' ס"ו

[8] שו"ע יו"ד סי' קט"ז ושוע"ר חו"מ הל' שמירת גוף והנפש סעי' ז

[9] עי' שו"ת אז נדברו ח"ז סי' ע"ב וס' שמירת הגוף והנפש סי' י"ד

[10] שם

[11]  עי' שוע"ר מהדור"ק סי' ד:י"ד וקצוה"ש סי' ב:ז וס"ק כ"א

[12] עי' שו"ת יבי"א

[13] ראה דרכ"ת סי' קט"ז ס"ק ל"ז

[14] כל זה לפענ"ד

[15] שוע"ר סי' קפ"א:ב ועי' ס' שולחן הטהור

[16] עי' ט"ז או"ח סי' ד' ס"ק י"א ומשב"ז שם ושוע"ר שם סעי' ט"ו

[17] שוע"ר שם

[18] עי' פרמ"ג שם סק"ז וי"א

[19] במהדור"ת סעי' ד:ב

[20] עי' שו"ת מנח"י ח"ד סי' קי"ז ושו"ת אז נדברו שם וסי' ע"ג

[21] עי' שוע"ר שם וגמ' שבת ק"ט.

Question: What is the Din regarding eating Unshelled nuts on Shabbos?

Question: What is the Din regarding eating Unshelled nuts on Shabbos?


Answer: Like many areas of Hilchos Shabbos, this question touches on more than one melachah.

The Mishnah [1] enumerates the ל״ט מלאכות,  the 39 categories of creative labor prohibited on Shabbos. Two of those melachos are directly relevant here: Dosh (threshing) and Borer (selecting).

Dosh refers to extracting an edible item from its natural casing or shell, similar to threshing grain from its husk. Borer refers to separating desirable items from undesirable matter.

In the normal process of preparing foods that grow enclosed in a shell, there are two distinct steps:

1. Breaking open the shell, this parallels the melachah of Dosh, as one is extracting the food from its protective outer layer.

2. Removing or separating the edible portion from the shell fragments, this parallels the melachah of Borer, separating food from waste.


The same halachic framework applies when eating nuts on Shabbos. Cracking the shell and separating the nut from it implicates these two melachos, and the permissibility depends on the specific manner and timing in which it is done (e.g., derech achilah, the normal way of eating, for immediate consumption).[2]

There are various types of nuts, and their structure is not halachically insignificant.

Most nuts grow with two protective layers: An outer green, leafy husk, a softer covering that surrounds the nut while it grows on the tree. Its purpose is to protect the inner shell from cracking if it falls to the ground. A hard inner shell, the rigid casing that directly encases the edible nut. In addition, some nuts contain a thin inner skin that clings directly to the nut itself, beneath the hard shell.

In contemporary practice, the majority of nuts sold in stores no longer have the outer green husk attached. They are typically sold either with only the hard shell or fully shelled, sometimes still covered by the thin inner skin.


For purposes of our discussion, we will not address the outer green husk, since it is generally removed prior to sale and not part of the typical Shabbos scenario. Our focus will instead be on the hard shell and any thin inner layer attached directly to the edible nut.


As explained above, the melachah of Dosh (threshing) refers to removing an item from its natural covering[3].

The Av Melachah of Dosh is performing this act in its classic, constructive form, for example, breaking a shell or peel using a utensil specifically designed for that purpose. The Toldah (derivative form) of Dosh is extracting something from its natural casing even by hand[4]. This derivative is known as Mefarek[5], literally, “taking apart” or extracting.

Common examples include: Removing peas from their pods[6], Squeezing grapes to extract their juice[7]

Both cases involve separating the desired food from its natural enclosure. (It should be noted that squeezing gravy or fat out of meat is permitted provided that the liquid itself is not desired; since the intent is merely to remove excess liquid from the meat and not to obtain the extracted gravy or fat, it does not constitute the prohibited form of Mefarek[8].)

Poskim outline several defining criteria for the melachah of Mefarek (a Toldah of Dosh):

1. The edible item must have grown attached to its covering[9] — meaning the food and its casing develop as a single natural unit from the beginning of growth.


2. The covering is normally removed in the field or factory, as part of the standard production process[10], rather than at the time of eating.


3. The covering is substantial and thick[11], not merely a loose or superficial layer.


Applying these criteria to nuts yields a nuanced discussion:

Criterion 1 – Attached to Growth: Many nuts do not have their hard shell halachically classified as something “attached” to the edible portion in the same way that grain is attached to its husk. The nut develops within the shell, but the edible portion is not bonded to the shell itself. Based on this reasoning, cracking nuts would not meet the first criterion of classic Mefarek.

Criterion 2 – Normally Removed in the Field: Today, most nuts are sold already shelled. This might suggest that shelling is considered a production-stage activity, potentially fitting the second criterion.

However, there is strong room to argue that since it is common and normal for people to crack nuts immediately before eating them, their shells are not viewed as coverings that are “normally removed in the field.” Rather, cracking them is part of the derech achilah, the normal manner of consumption[12].

Criterion 3 – Thick Shell: Nut shells are certainly thick and substantial, which would support classifying them within the framework of Mefarek.

L’halacha, the poskim[13] rule that one is permitted to crack open nuts on Shabbos. Nevertheless, certain guidelines are given to ensure that the act is clearly defined as derech achilah (the normal manner of eating) and not as an act of preparation or constructive extraction:

1. Preferably, one should avoid using a designated nutcracker[14]. While many authorities do not strictly prohibit it, refraining from using a specialized utensil helps avoid resembling the classic melachah of Dosh performed with a kli designed for that purpose.


2. One should open only one nut at a time and eat it before opening another[15]. This demonstrates that the shelling is part of the immediate act of eating, rather than preparing food in advance.


By limiting the action to immediate consumption and performing it in the normal manner of eating, cracking nuts on Shabbos is not viewed as Mefarek, but rather as part of the permissible process of achilah itself.

Until now, we have focused on the possible concern of Dosh / Mefarek. We must now turn to a second potential issue: Borer.

As mentioned earlier, preparing a nut for consumption involves two stages: Cracking the shell, which raises the question of Dosh/Mefarek. Separating the edible nut from the shell fragments, which may raise the issue of Borer.


The melachah of Borer (selecting) prohibits separating desired items from undesired matter in a constructive manner.

In the case of nuts, once the shell is broken, one must remove the edible portion from among the inedible shell pieces. This is essentially a mixture of ochel (food) and p’soles (waste), and separating the two appears, at first glance, to fit squarely within the parameters of Borer.

The question, therefore, becomes: Is removing the nut from the shell considered a prohibited act of selecting, or is it permitted as part of derech achilah, the normal manner of eating?

The halachah[16] teaches that selecting is permitted on Shabbos only when all three of the following conditions are met:

1. Ochel from P’soles – One must remove the “good” (the food) from the “bad” (the waste), not the reverse. Removing the shell from the nut would be prohibited; taking the nut from the shell is permitted.


2. By Hand (B’yad) – The separation must be done by hand and not with a utensil specifically designed for selecting or sorting.


3. For Immediate Use (Miyad) – The separation must take place immediately before eating, as part of the normal process of consumption, not for later use.


When the three conditions of Borer are met — ochel from p’soles, by hand, and for immediate use — the act is classified as derech achilah, the normal manner of eating, and not the constructive melachah of Borer.

Accordingly, if one removes the nut from the broken shell pieces by hand and immediately before eating, there is no issue of Borer.

The Thin Peel on the Nut

As discussed, removing the nut from the shell immediately before eating does not violate Borer when done by hand and for immediate consumption. But what about the thin peel that sometimes remains attached to the nut itself? Why is removing that peel not considered separating bad from good?

Two primary reasons are given:

1) It Is Derech Achilah

The essence of Borer is refining or fixing a mixture in a constructive way. Anything that is done as part of the normal process of eating is permitted. Since people commonly remove this thin peel immediately before eating the nut, it is viewed as part of derech achilah and not as an act of purification or constructive sorting[17].

2) The Peel Is Edible

In many cases, the peel itself is technically edible[18]. The prohibition of Borer applies when separating edible from inedible. However, separating two types of edible items is permitted[19]. Since the peel is considered food (even if less desirable), removing it does not constitute classic Borer.

A Third Issue: Muktzah

There is, however, an additional concern unrelated to Dosh or Borer.

The halachah[20] states that shells, peels, and bones that are not edible — even for animals — are classified as Muktzah on Shabbos. Since nut shells are generally inedible, they fall into this category and may not be handled directly.

This creates a practical difficulty: Once the nut is cracked open, the shell fragments become Muktzah. Removing the nut from among the shells without directly moving the shells can be challenging, potentially leading to a violation of the prohibition against handling Muktzah.

Therefore, while cracking and eating nuts on Shabbos is fundamentally permitted (when done properly), one must be mindful not only of Dosh and Borer, but also of the practical implications of Muktzah when dealing with the leftover shells.

L’halacha: The Alter Rebbe writes[21] that it is very difficult to avoid the issues of Borer (since one may come to throw away the shell and leave the nut in his hand) and Muktzah (as explained), the Alter Rebbe concludes that one should refrain from eating unshelled nuts on Shabbos.

Practically speaking, since today virtually all types of nuts are readily available pre-shelled and peeled, there is no compelling reason to enter into these halachic complications on Shabbos.

This conclusion reflects an important principle in Hilchos Shabbos: even where something may technically be permitted under ideal conditions, if it is highly prone to error, it is proper to avoid it altogether.


 

[1]שבת ע"ג

[2] עי' שביתת שבת בפתיחה למלאכות דש אות ב

[3] שוע"ר סי' ש"ה:כ"ח עי' פרמ"ג א"א ריש סי' ש"כ ואגלי טל מל' דש סעי' י

[4] שוע"ר סי' שי"ט:ט ועי' סי' תק"י קו"א סק"א

[5] עי' פרש"י צ"ה ע"א וחי' צ"צ מ"ו.ד

[6] שוע"ר סי' שי"ט:ט

[7] שוע"ר סי' ש"כ:א

[8] שוע"ר סי' ש"כ:י"א

[9] חי' צ"צ מ"ו,ד וקוצה"ש סי' קכ"ו סק"ז

[10] שביתת שבת הובא בקוצה"ש שם ועי' שו"ת אגרות משה או"ח ח"א סי' קכ"ה

[11] פרמ"ג א"א סי' שי"ט סק"ח הגהות רע"א סי' שכ"א ברמ"א סעי' י"ט

[12] עי' קוצה"ש שם

[13] קוצה"ש שם ושו"ת אג"מ שם ועי' שו"ת שבט הלוי ח"א סי' פ"א

[14] דלכא' הוי בכלי עי' קוצה"ש שם וסק"ח אמנם עי' שש"כ פ"ג סעי' ל"ח

[15] קוצה"ש שם ושו"ת שבט הלוי שם

[16] שוע"ר סי' שי"ט:א

[17] לשון אדה"ז שם

[18] עי' קוצה"ש סק"ח

[19] שוע"ר שם סעי' ד-ה

[20] שוע"ר סי' ש"ח:ס

[21] סידור הלכתא רבתא לשבתא

Questions: what Brocha is said on chocolates? And chocolate-covered almonds?

Questions: what Brocha is said on chocolates? And chocolate-covered almonds?


Answer: The Halacha is that the brocha recited on fruits of a tree is בורא פרי העץ.[1] However, what qualifies as a “fruit of a tree” for this purpose depends on how Halacha defines a tree.

The Talmud Bavli[2] explains that the determining factor is whether the tree itself remains intact from year to year. If the trunk or main body of the plant survives through the winter and produces new fruit the following season, its fruit receives the brocha בורא פרי העץ.

By contrast, if the plant does not survive through the winter — meaning it must be replanted each year — then even if it produces fruit, the proper brocha is בורא פרי האדמה, since it is not halachically classified as a tree but rather as a plant that grows from the ground annually.

There is a debate among the Rishonim as to how to understand this Gemara. Some explain that the determining factor is the survival of the trunk; others focus on whether the branches regenerate from the same enduring structure. As a result, in practical Halacha[3], we find differing opinions as to how this rule is applied.

However, according to all[4], the defining criterion is that if the tree’s branches remain intact through the winter and continue producing fruit from that existing structure, the brocha on its fruit is בורא פרי העץ.

Chocolate is produced from the seeds of the tropical cacao tree, known as Theobroma cacao. At first glance, since it grows on a tree, one might argue that its brocha should be בורא פרי העץ.

However, the cacao seed in its natural state is extremely bitter and essentially inedible. In order to become usable, it undergoes significant processing: it is fermented, dried, cleaned, and roasted. After this stage, it is further refined into various products. Some remain in the form of cocoa powder, while others are processed into chocolate.

Generally, two primary types of chocolate are produced:

1. Bitter (unsweetened) chocolate — typically used for baking or cooking.


2. Sweet chocolate — where sugar and other ingredients are added, making it palatable and enjoyable as a confection.


This extensive processing, transforming the seed from an inedible, bitter bean into a sweet, edible product, plays a central role in determining the correct brocha, as will be explained.

The Halacha states[5] that any fruit which is prepared by adding sugar or other ingredients — even if in its natural state it is not edible — nevertheless retains its original brocha, provided that it is grown with that purpose in mind.

In other words, if the fruit is cultivated specifically in order to be processed (for example, sweetened or otherwise enhanced) and that is the normal and intended manner of its consumption, its halachic status follows its source.

Based on the above, it would seem that the proper brocha on all forms of chocolate should be[6] בורא פרי העץ, since cacao grows on a tree and is cultivated specifically for processing (עי' הערה).

Nevertheless, the established custom is to recite שהכל נהיה בדברו on chocolate[7]. An explanation may be based on the halachic principle regarding mixtures.

The Shulchan Aruch[8] rules that when one eats a mixture of two foods, and one component is more desirable (חביב) to the person than the other, the brocha is recited on the preferred component, even if the second component is significant and even necessary to the mixture.

Applying this to chocolate: Chocolate is consumed primarily for its sweet taste. That sweetness comes largely from the added sugar and other ingredients. The cocoa component itself is often only about 40% (or less) of the mixture. One would generally not eat pure, unsweetened cacao in its natural bitter state.


Since the primary enjoyment and preference is for the sweetened product, not for the cacao itself, the added ingredients become halachically dominant. Therefore, the proper brocha is[9] שהכל נהיה בדברו, which explains the widespread custom.


Until now, we have discussed the proper Brocha on chocolates. Lets us now discuss fruits such as almonds, which had a chocolate coating on them.


As explained, all fruits that grow on a tree require the brocha בורא פרי העץ, and since almonds grow on a tree, their brocha is העץ [10]

Regarding chocolate, although there is discussion whether it should technically be העץ, the accepted custom is to recite שהכל.

Which Brocha Takes Precedence When They Are Together?

When two different foods with different brochot are eaten together, the determining factor is the halachic principle of ikar v’tafel — primary and secondary components.

Earlier, we discussed the principle of עיקר וטפל, that when two foods are combined, the brocha is recited on the primary component, which exempts the secondary.

The Shulchan Aruch[11] rules that when fruit is mixed with other ingredients, such as in a jam, the brocha remains that of the fruit, since the fruit is the primary element and the added ingredients merely enhance it. The same applies to sugar-coated fruits[12]; the sugar serves to improve the fruit, but does not become independently significant.

However, this principle applies only when the person’s primary intent is for the fruit, and the additional ingredients are clearly secondary.

In the case of chocolate-covered almonds, the situation is different. Here, a person typically desires both components, the almond and the chocolate[13]. The chocolate is not merely enhancing the almond; it is independently desirable and contributes substantially to the experience. If so, the classic framework of עיקר וטפל may not apply in the simple sense, since neither component is clearly subordinate.

There is an important distinction to be made: When the chocolate is merely a light coating or a thin drizzle, the fruit or nut is clearly the primary component, with the chocolate secondary. In such a case, the almond retains its status as the ikar, and the brocha is בורא פרי העץ. However, when there is a thick chocolate coating [14], the analysis changes.

Majority and Dominance

It would seem that when the chocolate forms the majority of the mixture, the brocha should be שהכל, whereas if the nut constitutes the majority, the brocha should be העץ[15].

This follows the general halachic approach that when two independently significant foods are combined, and neither is clearly subordinate, we examine which component is dominant, whether by quantity or by primary intent.

Nevertheless, the preferable approach in cases of a thick chocolate coating is as follows[16]: First recite שהכל on a piece of the chocolate alone. Then recite בורא פרי העץ on the almond portion separately. In doing so, one satisfies both possible considerations.

However, care must be taken when reciting the שהכל on the chocolate not to have in mind to exempt the almond[17]. If one were to intend to include the almond in that brocha, he would no longer be able to recite העץ afterward, as the first brocha would have already covered it.

L’halacha: The custom is to recite שהכל on sweet chocolates and בורא פרי העץ on bitter cooking chocolates, as well as on cocoa with only a small amount of sugar added[18].

Regarding chocolate-covered almonds, לכתחילה, one should ideally recite separate brochot on each component. However, בדיעבד, if one knows which ingredient is the majority, only the brocha corresponding to that majority is recited. In a case where a person is unsure which is the majority, the brocha of שהכל is said[19].



 

[1] שוע"ר סי' ר"ב:א וסבה"נ פ"ו ה"א

[2] ברכות מ.

[3] עי' שוע"ר סי' ר"ג וסבה"נ פ"ו

[4] שם ועי' קצוה"ש סי' מ"ט בהערה ו

[5] שוע"ר סי' ר"ב:י"ח ור"ג:ה-ו וסבה"נ פ"ו הי"ד

[6] שם (ולכאו' נר' דיש קצת סתירה בדעת אדה"ז דבסבה"נ פ"ו ה"א כתב שכל זמן שהפרי אינו נאכל אפילו ע"י הדחק אלא ע"י שאר דברים ברכתו "שהכל", ובה' י"ד שם כתב דפירות שאינן ראויים אע"י שאר דברים מ"מ ברכתו "העץ"? ויש לתרץ דבה' י"ד איירי שנוטע ע"ד להתבשלו עם שאר דברים דוקא משא"כ בה' א שם. ועפ"ז נמצא דקקאו שנוטע דוקא לעשות ממנו שוקלד ברכתו "שהכל" משא"כ אם נעשה לקקאו ברכתו "העץ" ועי' לקמן בסוף התשובה) ועי' שו"ת מנחת שלמה ח"א סי' צ"א

[7] שערי תשובה סי' ר"ב סקט"ז

[8] שוע"ר סי' רי"ב:א וט' וסי' ר"ד:י"ז וסבה"נ פ"ד ה"א ופ"א הי"ד (ואין לומר הטעם משום כיון שנשתנה צורתו ברכתו "שהכל", דהא זהו רק כשאין דרכו לאכלו כך משא"כ כאן בהקקאו כן הוא עשייתו עי' שוע"ר סי' ר"ב:י"ז וסי' ר"ד:ט"ז ובסבה"נ פ"י הכ"ד

[9] עי' שו"ת תשובות והנהגות ח"א סי' קפ"ג ושו"ת שבט הלוי ח"ז סי' כ"ז אות ב

[10] סבה"נ פ"ו ה"ב

[11] שוע"ר סי' ר"ד סעיפים ט"ז וי"ז

[12] פרמ"ג סי' ר"ד הובא במשנ"ב סי' ר"ד:נ"א

[13] בפשטות דיכול לקנות שקדים בלי מחופים בשוקלד

[14] עי' שו"ת שבה"ל הנ"ל אות ד שם

[15]  שוע"ר סי' רי"ב:א וסבה"נ פ"ג ה"א ועי' בשו"ת דבר יהושע ח"ב סי' קט"ו (אמנם עי' ס' סדר ברכת הנהנין שיו"ל ע"י ישיבה גדולה מעלברון ע' 161 הע' 14 מה שמביא בשם הרה"ג הרה"ח ר' ש"ז דברקין, ויש לו' דזה הי' בעיקר בזמנו)

[16]שוע"ר סי' רי"ב:ח וסבה"נ פ"ג הי"ד ושו"ת אגרות משה ח"ג סי' ל"א (ואין לעשות ס"ס לו' דכיון שיש פקפוק על עצם דין של הברכה של שוקלד, דמנהג ישראל תורה היא)

[17] דאז כבר פטר עצמו מברכה על השני עי' שו"ת אג"מ הנ"ל וסבה"נ פ"ג הט"ז

[18] עי' שו"ת מנחת שלמה הנ"ל כה"ח סקע"א

[19] שוע"ר סי' ר"ב:כ"ד וסבה"נ פ"א ה"ב

Question: Is one allowed to take pills with water before Kiddush on Friday night?

Question: Is one allowed to take pills with water before Kiddush on Friday night?

Answer: The Gemara  quotes the statement of Rav: “Just as Shabbos establishes the obligation for Maaser, so too it establishes the obligation for Kiddush.”

The Rishonim  explain this comparison as follows. Regarding Maaser, produce that has not yet become “kovea l’maaser” may still be eaten casually (achilas arai). However, once Shabbos begins, the sanctity of Shabbos itself obligates the produce for Maaser, and even casual eating becomes forbidden until Maaser is separated.

Similarly, the arrival of Shabbos obligates Kiddush. Once the time of Shabbos begins, one may not eat or drink before making Kiddush. Just as Shabbos fixes the obligation for Maaser, it also fixes the obligation of Kiddush, creating the restriction against eating or drinking beforehand.

The Rosh  gives further explanation for the prohibition of eating or drinking before Kiddush.

He explains that the verse “וְקָרָאתָ לַשַּׁבָּת עֹנֶג”, “You shall call the Shabbos a delight”, teaches that eating and drinking are expressions of oneg Shabbos. Since eating or drinking provides pleasure, even a very small amount is considered significant and not merely casual consumption.

Therefore, even the smallest amount of eating or drinking is viewed as a form of established enjoyment (kvius). Because the Torah instructs us to honor Shabbos through this enjoyment, it must first be preceded by Kiddush.

Accordingly, once Shabbos begins, one may not eat or drink anything before making Kiddush, since the enjoyment of Shabbos through food or drink must be introduced with Kiddush.

From this Gemara, it is understood that any food or drink is forbidden before making Kiddush. Later, the Gemara  discusses a dispute regarding a person who tasted something before making Kiddush—whether such a person may still go on to recite Kiddush afterwards.

The Beit Yosef  derives an important point from this discussion. Since the Gemara addresses the question only in a bedi’eved situation, after someone has already tasted something, it implies that initially (lechatchilah), everyone agrees that one may not taste anything before Kiddush.

The Rishonim disagree as to whether drinking water is included in this prohibition. From the wording of the Rambam , it appears that he holds that water is not included in the restriction, and therefore, one would be permitted to drink water before Kiddush. The Rashba , however, maintains that even water is included in the prohibition, and one may not drink it before Kiddush.

The halacha recorded in the Shulchan Aruch follows the opinion of the Rashba, that even drinking water was prohibited before Kiddush .

Further explanation is needed to understand why water would be included in this prohibition. There appear to be two different approaches to understanding the issue.

One approach  is that the prohibition of eating or drinking before Kiddush is derived from the verse “וְקָרָאתָ לַשַּׁבָּת עֹנֶג”, “You shall call the Shabbos a delight.” As explained earlier, eating and drinking are forms of oneg Shabbos. Since food and drink provide pleasure, even a small amount is considered significant and requires Kiddush beforehand.

According to this understanding, the concept would seemingly apply only to things that are normally considered forms of enjoyment, meaning things from which people derive pleasure.

However, even water provides a certain degree of benefit (hana’ah). When a person drinks water, there is still some element of satisfaction and relief, and therefore it could still fall under the category of oneg. According to this reasoning, even drinking water would be included in the prohibition before Kiddush.

The second approach  understands the prohibition differently. According to this view, the restriction of eating or drinking before Kiddush is an intrinsic prohibition tied to the time itself.

In other words, once the time for Kiddush arrives, the period of Shabbos creates a halachic restriction against eating or drinking until Kiddush is recited. The prohibition is therefore not dependent on whether the person derives pleasure or benefit from the food or drink.

This can be compared to the prohibition of eating on Yom Kippur. On Yom Kippur, the prohibition is not limited to foods that provide enjoyment or benefit; rather, the sanctity of the day itself creates the prohibition to eat or drink, regardless of the level of pleasure involved .

According to this understanding, even drinking plain water would be included in the prohibition, since the issue is not the enjoyment of the drink but rather the halachic status of the time before Kiddush.

The practical halachic difference between these two approaches emerges in a case where a person drinks water not for thirst, but merely for a functional purpose, such as to help swallow something.

According to the first approach, where the prohibition before Kiddush is connected to the concept of oneg (pleasure), the restriction would apply only when the drinking provides some desired enjoyment or benefit. Therefore, in a case where a person does not want the water for its own sake, such as rinsing out one’s mouth before Kiddush, or drinking a small amount of water merely to swallow medication, the water itself does not provide meaningful benefit. This is supported by the halachic principle  that one does not recite a bracha on water when drinking it without thirst, for example, when taking medication. In such a situation, it would seemingly be permitted .

According to the second approach, however, the prohibition is created by the time itself; once the time of Kiddush has arrived, eating or drinking is forbidden until Kiddush is recited. If so, the person’s intention to gain pleasure or benefit is irrelevant. The very act of drinking is what is prohibited.

This would be similar to the prohibition of eating and drinking on Yom Kippur, where the restriction is not dependent on enjoyment. For that reason, even actions such as rinsing one’s mouth would be prohibited.

From the explanation in the Shulchan Aruch HaRav on this halacha, it appears that he follows the second approach .

The Alter Rebbe writes that the Chachamim prohibited any tasting, even of water, from the time that the obligation of Kiddush begins until one makes Kiddush. This time begins from bein hashmashos, or even earlier, such as in the middle of the afternoon, if one has already davened Ma’ariv.

He further explains that although in many other cases where the Chachamim prohibited eating or drinking before performing a mitzvah, they still allowed tasting, in the case of Kiddush,they were more stringent. The reason is that the time of the mitzvah of Kiddush is specifically at the onset of Shabbos, and therefore, the restriction begins immediately with the arrival of that time .

From this explanation, it appears clear that the prohibition is intrinsic to the time itself, rather than dependent on the enjoyment derived from the eating or drinking.

Further support for this understanding can be seen from another ruling of the Alter Rebbe. When discussing a case where someone makes Kiddush in shul but does not intend to fulfill his obligation with that Kiddush, he may not drink the wine. The Alter Rebbe  advises that the wine should be given to a child to drink. Normally, one may not give a child something that is prohibited to eat or drink. However, in this case, it is permitted because the prohibition is time-dependent, similar to the prohibition of eating on Yom Kippur.

This indicates that the restriction before Kiddush is not a classic prohibition of food itself, but rather a restriction created by the sanctity of the time, which supports the second approach.

Based on this, in our case, the pills themselves would be permitted (when they are needed for health purposes), since they do not have the halachic status of food at all . However, taking them together with water to swallow them would, according to the view of the Alter Rebbe, appear not to be permitted, since even drinking water alone is included in the rabbinic restriction before Kiddush.

There is an additional reason why drinking water should be avoided on Friday night, particularly during the time of bein hashmashos. The Alter Rebbe  cites a Midrash  which warns that there is a danger in drinking water at that time. Because of this concern as well, drinking water during that period is discouraged.

Accordingly, while the pills themselves may be taken when necessary, one should ideally avoid swallowing them with water until after Kiddush, unless there is a significant need that would justify doing so.

Women Lighting Shabbos Candles and the Laws of Kiddush

In the Shulchan Aruch , there are differing opinions regarding whether a woman who lights Shabbos candles is considered to have accepted Shabbos, and therefore whether all Shabbos laws, including the obligation to make or hear Kiddush, apply to her immediately afterward.

The Alter Rebbe  writes that the custom is that women accept Shabbos when lighting. Accordingly, once a woman lights the candles, she would generally be prohibited from eating or drinking until she makes Kiddush.

However, the Alter Rebbe explains that a condition made before lighting, stating that the lighting should not constitute acceptance of Shabbos, is effective in a time of need. Therefore, if a woman needs to take pills, and it is already late, but she must light the candles, she may make this condition beforehand, and she would then be permitted to take the pills with water. It is important to note that this conditional leniency is only valid until sunset (shkiyah) .

All of the above applies in situations where there is no significant urgency to eat or drink. However, if a woman is weak or sick, and her health requires drinking water or taking medication, she is permitted to do so regardless, since her well-being takes precedence .

L’halacha

From the time of shkiyah (sunset), or from the moment one accepts Shabbos, until after making Kiddush, drinking water is prohibited, even if it is needed to help swallow pills.

However, a woman before lighting Shabbos candles, who needs to drink, may make a condition by saying or thinking that she does not wish to accept Shabbos through the lighting. In this case, she is permitted to drink until just before sunset.

If a person is weak or in pain, they are allowed to drink water before Kiddush, even without making a condition. In cases of life-threatening conditions, such as taking antibiotics and one is not able to swallow without the help of water, it would be permitted to take the pill with any amount of water necessary.

Chometz rubbish in one’s bins on Erev Pesach

Question: On Erev Pesach, if one has chometz that wasn’t burnt or sold, can it be thrown into garbage bins on one’s property?


Answer: To avoid violating the biblical prohibitions of בל יראה ובל ימצא, one must remove all chometz from one’s possession before the 6th hour on Erev Pesach (chatzos) . This can be accomplished in one of two ways: either by destroying the chometz (e.g., burning it or casting it to the wind ), or by removing ownership (e.g., declaring it hefker or selling it to a non-Jew ), even if the physical chometz remains.

If chometz (which was neither destroyed nor removed from one’s ownership) remains in one’s possession after the 6th hour on Erev Pesach, one can no longer remove ownership, and it must be physically destroyed .

This raises a very practical question: if chometz is sitting in garbage bags in one’s garbage bin, is it still considered in one’s possession, requiring removal before the deadline or destruction?

This is common, as chometz is often left in household bins for several days before being collected by the sanitation department.

Privately Owned Bin

If the garbage bin belongs to the homeowner or building residents, it is considered one’s property, and placing chometz there does not fulfill the requirement of removing it from one’s possession .

This remains true even if the bins are placed outside the boundaries of one’s property, since the bins themselves retain the status of one’s halachic chotzer . Accordingly, unless one declares the bins hefker (in the presence of three people ), the chometz remains in one’s possession .

This option (making the bin hefker) is only effective before the 6th hour on Erev Pesach, not afterwards .

(Once the garbage containing the chometz has been removed, e.g., by the sanitation department, the bins may be brought back onto one’s property , although not on Yom Tov itself due to muktzah considerations .)

Public / Government-Owned Bins

Using a public bin would be effective, provided the chometz is placed there before the 6th hour, since it is no longer in one’s possession .

However, government-issued bins for which one pays a usage fee may be halachically considered like rented property , and thus retain the status of one’s own domain. In such a case, they would have the same issue as a privately owned bin.

After the 6th Hour

Leaving edible chometz, even if only fit for animal consumption, in such bins after the 6th hour is problematic. At that point, the only viable solution is to invalidate the chometz completely, by rendering it unfit even for a dog (נפסל מאכילת כלב), such as by pouring strong chemicals (e.g., bleach) directly onto the chometz .

Including Bins in the Sale

Some suggest  including the garbage bins in the sale of chometz to a non-Jew before Pesach. However, this raises practical concerns :

● One would then be unable to use the bins on Pesach, as they would belong to a non-Jew.


● Additionally, it is questionable whether the non-Jew would agree to acquire bins containing garbage that is destined to be removed, and thus not truly his.

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